"Government Contained?" Explaining Spanish Supreme Court's decisions on EU law by Mayoral, Juan A.
	  	  
“Government Contained?” 
Explaining Spanish Supreme Court’s 
decisions on EU law 
	  
Juan A. Mayoral 
PhD researcher, Department of Political & Social Sciences 
European University Institute, Florence 
juan.mayoral@eui.eu 
	  
ABSTRACT: The question of why and when European Law is enforced by national courts may be 
one of the most important questions that scholars on the European Union seek to answer. Citizens 
and other social and economic actors turn to courts as an instrument of enforcement when 
implementation problems of EU law occur in their countries. The main aim of this work is to 
understand the main mechanisms behind the judicial enforcement of EU law, looking for this 
purpose at the diverse elements that play a part during the judicial decision-making of the Spanish 
Supreme Court, which judgments may shape the impact of EU regulation on national policies. The 
study finds to what extent high courts are concerned about the reaction of the authorities. 
Moreover, the results show how the courts cite ECJ to support their decisions where the EU law 
challenges the main principles and prerogatives of the national authorities. 
KEYWORDS: ECJ rulings, EU law enforcement, Member States, Supreme Court, judicial 
policy-making, strategic behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of why and how European Law is applied by courts may be one of the most 
important questions that scholars on the European Union seek to answer. Citizens and 
other social and economic actors turn to courts as a last resort of enforcement when 
implementation problems of EU (European Union) law occur in their countries. Citizens 
and interest groups hold in their hands a powerful weapon to enforce European regulation 
when courts become involved in the process of implementation of EU law (Slepcevic 2009; 
Stone Sweet 2004). Therefore, this important role of national courts makes crucial the 
understanding of the conditions under which national courts enforce EU law to unveil the 
dynamics of the judicial implementation of EU legislation. 
The study of the enforcement of EU law by national courts has usually focused on the 
most important cases that have resulted in the application of EU law decided by high 
courts. Moreover, scholars who have sought to systematically explain the compliance with 
EU law by national courts have mostly looked to the use of preliminary references 
(Carrubba and Murrah 2005) and the compliance with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
(Ramos Romeu 2006), omitting to determine which factors induce national courts to 
enforce EU law. The main aim of this work is to understand the main mechanisms behind 
the enforcement of EU law by national courts (NCs), looking for this purpose at the 
diverse characteristics and elements that play a part during the judicial decision-making. 
The analysis explores the judicial responses of national high courts to diverse incentives 
and constraints present during EU law cases and how these factors determine the 
enforcement of EU law by courts when they make a decision, studying the case of the 
Spanish Supreme Court. 
The study finds out to what extent national courts are concerned about the reaction of 
the competent authorities. Second, there is evidence that national courts opt to cite ECJ in 
those cases where the EU law challenges the main principles and prerogatives of the 
national authorities of each Member State. These main results empirically corroborate the 
conclusions of Georges and Takis Tridimas’ (2004), Ramos’ (2003; 2006) and Obermaier’ 
(2008) on the use of ECJ rulings as political safeguard against governments’ non-
compliance. This paper seeks to complement these contributions by offering a strategic 
explanation of the EU law decisions of national high courts, taking into account the 
position of each litigant in relation to EU law, that is, whether the appellant/respondent is 
in favor or against EU law enforcement. 
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The paper is organized as follows: in the next section I briefly describe the pattern of 
the Spanish Supreme Court in the application of EU law. The second section discusses the 
different theories given to explain why and how national courts enforce EU law. The third 
section describes the data, variables, and method used for the analysis. In the following 
section I use quantitative analysis to test the arguments of the previous sections, closing the 
paper with the conclusions. 
 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF EU LAW BY THE SPANISH SUPREME COURT (2000-
2009): HIGH COURTS AS ALLOCATORS OF EU RIGHTS, BENEFITS AND 
POLICIES 
This research focuses on explaining the application of EU law by the Spanish Supreme 
Court from 2000 to 2009. This consideration is determined by the structure and function 
of appellate bodies, such as Supreme Courts, as allocators of gains and losses (Haynie, 
Songer, Tate, and Sheehan 2005). While in ordinary courts, the resolution of the dispute 
affects only the parties directly at dispute, for appellate and high courts the judgments serve 
as statements that shape the relationship of the EU law with the rest of the legal domestic 
system, at the same time that determines the impact of EU regulation with evident consequences 
for the development of national policies. Somehow, these decisions create policy precedents 
that are broadly applicable to other similar situations in which citizens, business, NGOs or 
the government are involved. Therefore, Supreme courts act as a political body that may 
determine the future development and implementation of governmental policies when 
shaping the allocation and enforcement of rights and benefits under EU regulation. The 
consequences of these judicial choices for EU policy development make necessary the 
understanding of the factors that influence this judicial policy implementation. 
Its definition as high court does not make it free from political or interest groups 
pressures. On the contrary, despite being one the highest institution in the hierarchy of the 
judicial system and main enforcer of law in Spain, its decisions are still under the judicial 
review of the Spanish Constitutional Court in case they make a decision enforcing EU law 
against the national constitution. Second, political institutions such as government and 
administration still retain faculty to react to its decisions. This means that administration 
and governments have the capacity to avoid judicial decisions misapplying, obstructing or 
non-applying EU law courts’ judgments. Another alternative for governments and 
parliament is the override of national courts’ rulings by the legislature passing new 
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legislation (Bednar, Jr., and Ferejohn 2001; Carrubba 2009; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; 
Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Rogers 2001; Staton and Vanberg 2008). 
Regarding its structure, the selection of the magistrates of the Supreme Court may be 
determined by factors related to the political attachment or compliance of judges with 
politics, apart from their acknowledged experience in legal fields. For example, in most 
cases, the nomination of the new magistrates is determined by a system of quotas and 
bargaining that is linked to the different political factions in the Judicial Council. Moreover, 
their careers are controlled by the Spanish Judicial Council (Consejo General del Poder Judicial), 
linked to political interests in its nomination and operation as well. Hence, the role that 
political interest performs in the selection and career of judges of the Supreme Court, some 
of whom may become judges more responsive for their decisions against political interest, 
and, specially the government. These considerations underline the fact that, as a judicial 
and political body, it is subject not only to legal factors but also several political ones which 
may, to some extent, influence the application of EU law in some important policy issues. 
National courts anticipating these ex-ante (selection and monitoring) and ex-post (non-
compliance) threats may attenuate their decisions securing at least the compliance by 
national competent institutions. They can do it, for example, enforcing national law 
compliance according to governments’ policy preferences. 
Since the Spanish accession to the European Community, the Spanish Supreme Court 
has received around 5200 cases concerning EU law. As we observe in figure 1, in the 
period of interest more than half of these EU law cases have been filed (n=3146). This rise 
in EU law cases filed in the Supreme Court stresses the increasing importance of this court 
for the enforcement of the EU regulations as the integration has deepened in several policy 
issues. 
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Figure	  1:	  EU	  law	  cases	  filed	  in	  the	  Spanish	  Supreme	  Court	  (1999-­‐2009)	  
	  
Source:	  CENDOJ	  database	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Supreme	  Court:	  www.	  http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/index.jsp	  
Observing the distribution of EU law cases within the Supreme Court, we realize a 
more relevant detail, which is the importance of this appellative body for the 
implementation of EU law by governmental and public bodies. More than a half of the 
cases (65% of EU law cases) are judged in administrative courts concerning decisions and 
acts taken by the administration, government or any public body. It means that most of the 
decisions taken in this courtroom of the Supreme Court as regards EU law may have a 
significant impact on the behavior of political institutions and policies, especially, after a 
judgment allowing an appeal against acts or regulations passed by the government or 
administration. 
Figure	  2:	  Distribution	  of	  EU	  law	  cases	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  by	  jurisdiction	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Source:	  CENDOJ	  database	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Supreme	  Court:	  www.	  http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/index.jsp	  
Concerning to the enforcement of EU law, figure 3 shows the diversity in the response of 
the Supreme Court when the litigants invoked EU law enforcement: 
Figure	  3:	  Success	  Rate	  on	  the	  enforcement	  of	  EU	  law	  (2000-­‐2009)	  
	  
Source:	  Caselex	  database	  
The explanations of these differences on the enforcement are used to be limit to the 
consideration of legal rules that guide the application of law. However, the logic of law is 
only one more constraint within the judicial-decision making process. There are other 
institutional factors, such as interest groups or governments, which may affect the judicial 
enforcement of EU law. From my point of view, for the explanation of this variance 
scholars must also take account of the institutional context, preferences and strategies of 
national judges as regards other actors in the domestic system that can influence or place 
constraints upon the NCs’ decisions. For that reason I will base my analysis on the strategic 
decision-making of national courts, disentangling the incentives and constraints of national 
judges in enforcing EU law. 
 
EXPLAINING THE ENFORCEMENT OF EU LAW BY NATIONAL COURTS: ECJ 
RULINGS AS A ‘POLITICAL SAFEGUARD’ 
There are several accounts in the literature that explain the application of EU law based on 
different theories of judicial behavior: legal, realist/inter-governmentalist and 
empowerment/neo-functionalist theories. One of the goals of this paper is to test 
empirically these three explanations that one can find in the literature of European Judicial 
Politics for the enforcement of EU law. Firstly, legal explanations posit that national court 
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want to maximize the correct application of EU law in their decisions, using the variations 
in national legal cultures and doctrines as an explanation (Chalmers 2001; Stone Sweet and 
Brunell 1998). This model assumes that the behavior of judges is determined by the rules 
(substantive and procedural rules), and legal traditions (e.g. monism/dualism) that regulate 
the application of EU law despite the constraints that other actors can bring to courts.1 
The second theory to consider is the realist or inter-governmentalist (Garrett 1995; Garrett, 
Kelemen, and Schulz 1998). National courts still interested on maximize the correct 
interpretation of EU law, care about the implementation of the compliance of their rulings 
by national authorities. Meanwhile, national authorities such as the government and the 
administration will try to maximize their own policy preferences neglecting or containing 
the application of EU law when it is invoked against their most preferred regulations and 
policies. 
Assuming these divergences in the preferences between institutions, governments may 
try deliberately to contain the enforcement EU law by national courts if they run counter to 
their policy interest or power (Conant 2002). Therefore, we can expect that European law 
enforcement by courts will be less if the European provisions to be implemented are 
opposed by the competent authorities supporting national provisions by means of the ex-
ante and ex-post controls and political threats that Member States can put to NC (see page 2-
3 above). Scholars have argued that these threats can influence judicial decision-making. 
Courts, by modifying or adapting their rulings in anticipation of a possible non-compliance 
by the competent authorities, may secure better outcomes than if they act myopically 
enforcing their most preferred EU legal or policy interpretation (Carrubba, Gabel, and 
Hankla 2008; Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2007; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990). 
Moreover, non-compliance can also undermine a court’s public legitimacy, and thereby 
reduce its future influence on policy and, to some extent, provoke removals from some 
justices of the court (Carrubba 2009; Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla 2008; Staton and 
Vanberg 2008). Either way, as long as courts care about implementing their judgments, 
they have an incentive to anticipate public institutions reactions when making their rulings 
concerning EU law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A more sophisticated explanation of the legal model, the team model, was developed by Kornhauser  (1992) 
and tested by Ramos Romeu to understand adjudicatory practices in European courts. “It draws from the 
institutional position of judges to posit that they share the common goal of maximizing the number of 
correct decisions given their resource constraints. The model says that courts in different levels of the 
hierarchy have different functions and most of the problems of courts consist of designing adequate 
adjudicatory strategies given the cases they hear” Ramos Romeu, Francisco. 2002. "Judicial Cooperation in 
the European Courts. Testing Three Models of Judicial Behavior." Global Jurist Frontiers 2. 
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According to these factors, I hypothesize that: 
h1: Government Deference : The Spanish Supreme Court is less likely to enforce EU law when 
government preferences are opposed to EU law enforcement. 
The third theory, the empowerment or neo-functionalist model, stresses the 
importance of the cooperation supranational judicial institutions in the process of judicial 
enforcement. NCs, as strategic actors as regards national institutions eager to protect their 
power control over national policies, will empower themselves against those institutions to 
secure their interests, competences and policy preferences within their own national legal 
and political context. According to empowerment explanations, NCs may enforce the 
compliance of the EU law through preliminary references (PR) and ECJ rulings to avoid 
the risk of a reversal of their domestic rulings (Conant 2002). Hence, the national judiciary 
will refer to the ECJ as a ‘sword’ to foster integration and to force change on reluctant 
governments (Obermaier 2008; Stone Sweet 2004). In words, of Ramos (2006: 400), 
“judges are strategic towards other political actors and invoke precedent to legitimize their 
exercise of power in the domestic context and divert criticism”.2 
EU legal system is organized to deal with non-compliance of Member States, especially 
when national courts enforce EU law complying with ECJ precedent. As Stone Sweet and 
Brunell (2010: 9): “Member State (…) non-compliance with any important ECJ ruling will 
generate new litigation, and new findings of non-compliance.” Therefore, NC referring 
cases and applying the ECJ rulings may force the administration and governments to 
consider implementing the rulings under the threat of receiving multiple lawsuits, 
infringement procedures or penalties against their non-compliance. 
Judges can decide the way in which they deal with EU law cases, such as their 
application of EU law, or take into consideration the opinion of other courts, that is, 
adjudicatory practice (Tridimas and Tridimas 2004). European courts rely on two types of 
adjudicatory practices: the use of PRs and the citation of cases previously decided by the 
ECJ. Concerning the use of PRs, NCs request ECJ rulings in order to provide an 
interpretation of an EU law provision or to declare the validity of an EU act. While PRs 
imply the request by NCs of an ECJ decision for clarification of a certain case at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Empowerment explanations are not restricted to the competition between NCs and the political and 
administrative institutions. As Alter points out, lower and higher courts have different institutional incentives. 
Lower courts tried to empower themselves through the PRs procedure, playing the higher courts and the ECJ 
off against each other so as to influence legal developments in the direction their prefer Alter, K. J. 1996. 
"The European Court's Political Power." West European Politics 19:458-87, —. 2001. Establishing the Supremacy of 
European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press.. However, these assumptions are not tested in this paper due to I only consider high court’s decisions. 
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national level, the rule of stare decisis requires that an earlier decision provides a reason for 
deciding a subsequent similar case in the same way (Kornhauser 1992). Among the cases 
already decided by the ECJ, national courts will be able to find an answer to the issues it 
faces supporting the enforcement of EU law. 
National courts can make use of these adjudicatory practices for avoiding criticism and 
legitimating their decisions against the menace of reversal of the government or other 
courts (Ramos Romeu 2006). Hence, in the same vein PR, citing the ECJ, may increase the 
likelihood that the government complies with the national court’s ruling in fields that are 
problematic for the reason that they run counter to government’s interest. In the sample 
used for this study, we observe (see figure 4) how the Spanish Supreme Court made 
recurrent use of adjudicatory practices to support its opinions: 
Figure	  4:	  Adjudicatory	  practices	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Supreme	  Court	  (2000-­‐2009)	  
 
The percentages indicate some preference of national courts for the use of ECJ 
citation instead of an ECJ ruling directly related to the case in hand. However, the citation 
of an ECJ previous ruling has it own risk. First of all, the empowerment of the national 
judgment is less due to the fact that the ECJ is not directly involved in the judicial process. 
Once a national court has received an ECJ ruling, the ECJ asks for a report expecting that 
the national judges have implemented its decisions at the national level. So, the threat of 
the reaction of the ECJ against non-compliance with its decisions has the power to 
legitimize national rulings taken by the national court against governments. Nevertheless, 
this supranational judicial control is missing in the case of ECJ citations, reducing the 
persuasiveness of the precedent against EU law opponents. Second, precedential practices 
are intrinsically submitted under a set of equivalence criteria that determine when two cases 
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are alike. Having a limited set of judgments made by the ECJ related with certain issues, 
national courts will find out those ECJ citations only partially fulfilled their policy 
expectations, or that they have a limited application to the case at hand. As a solution they 
should refer to the ECJ, to wait for a ruling that enforces their most preferred policy or 
legal interpretation. 
By the contrary, an ECJ ruling has its own disadvantages as well. First, there is the risk 
that the ECJ does not give a response to the case at hand due to the fact that the Court 
considers that the issue was already discussed in a previous filed case. This situation limits 
the possibility of searching for new ECJ rulings that could satisfy national courts’ 
preferences. Secondly, the ECJ takes decisions that sometimes do not meet the 
expectations of national courts (Nyikos 2003; Nyikos 2006). Apart from the delay in the 
proceedings, the discretion of interpretation of the ECJ could sometimes generate rulings 
against the interest of the national courts. If that is the case, judges should assume several 
costs depending on how they react to the decision of the ECJ. On one hand, one of these 
costs is the effort that would be invested in non-enforcing, re-referring or reformulating 
the ECJ ruling in the case that they find the ruling objectionable. Moreover, rulings 
disregarding ECJ ruling could carry new costs in terms of the reputation of national judges 
if litigants appeal the application in another court. On the other hand, courts resigned to 
accept non-preferred rulings also incur a loss in that it diminishes the utility extracted from 
this ECJ’s decision. Hence, having these advantages and disadvantages, national courts will 
be determined in their choice between ECJ precedents or preliminary references depending 
on three key factors, among others: how they value their most preferred policy, the 
closeness of the previous decisions taken by the ECJ to the policy preferences, and their 
risk aversion to non-satisfactory ECJ rulings.3 
Once I have identified the reasons that influence the decision of using ECJ precedent 
to support its judgments in comparison with preliminary references, I will test whether the 
Supreme Court use them to avoid criticism in the application of EU law against public 
institutions. Hence, I hypothesize that: 
h2: Government Chal lenge : The Spanish Supreme Court is more likely to enforce EU law against 
public institutions when it can support its opinion citing an ECJ ruling. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Other factors must be taking into account to assess why national courts cite ECJ rulings. These elements 
have been already mentioned in Tridimas & Tridimas Tridimas, Georges and Takis Tridimas. 2004. "National 
Courts and the European Court of Justice: A Public Choice Analysis of the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure." International Review of Law and Economics 24:125-145.; and Ramos’ research Ramos Romeu, 
Francisco. 2003. "Adjudicatory Practices in the European Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis." 
School of Law, New York University, New York City. 
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DATA, VARIABLES AND METHOD 
To assess the enforcement of EU law by the Spanish Supreme Court, the study comprises 
a dataset on EU law cases that contains information on particular aspects of the judgments 
that allows an analysis of the two hypotheses presented before. 
a) Dependent variable: EU law enforcement. 
The dataset was gathered from the CASELEX database that contains EU law cases decided 
by European higher courts. For this study I took the all the cases decided by the Spanish 
Supreme Court included in the database (n=205)4. At this point, I codified the treatment 
that the court gave when considering whether to enforce EU law in the case at hand5. To 
do this I used the following criteria taken from Ramos (2003) to classify EU law 
enforcement: 
0. The Supreme Court does not enforce EU law because: 
0.1. It is not temporally applicable to the case at hand 
0.2. It is not substantially or subjectively applicable to the case 
0.3. It does not have direct effect. 
0.4. National law is in compliance with the EU law 
0.5. It applies international law 
0.6. It is not superior to national law 
0.7. There is no EU law applicable to the case at hand. 
1. The Supreme Court enforce EU law: 
1.1. In conjunction with national law 
1.2. In conjunction with international law 
1.3. In spite of national law 
1.4. In spite of international law 
1.5. In support of national law 
The dependent variable adopts the value 1 whenever the Supreme Court enforces EU law 
and 0 otherwise. Within the dataset there are 112 out of 205 cases that enforce EU law 
(54.63% of the cases). 
b) Main explanatory Variables: 
- Against State or public institutions: The variable adopts the value 1 if the government 
(national or regional), administration or public body is against the enforcement of EU law 
either because they argue that EU law is not applicable to the case at hand or because their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In the cases that the Supreme Court has solved more than one important question regarding the application 
of EU law, each question has been considered as different case law. Nine cases has been doubled coded 
distinguishing the particular aspects of each question such as, position of the appellant regarding EU law 
application, the use of ECJ citation, the position of the government, etc. This coding scheme allows to 
accurately depicting the court’s ruling when, in the same case, its ruling favors one litigant on one set of issues 
but the other litigant on other issues. Carrubba, Clifford J., Matthew Gabel, and Charles Hankla. 2008. 
"Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice." American 
Political Science Review 102:435-452.. 
5 The codification of the law cases was based on my subjective evaluation. 
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act or national law was already implemented according EU law, and 0 otherwise. According 
to the main argument of the paper, I expect the Supreme Court to apply EU law less when 
the government or administrative body is against its enforcement. 
- ECJ citation: The variable codes 1 if the Supreme Court has cited an ECJ ruling and 0 
otherwise. As I mentioned before, I expect a positive effect on the use of ECJ citations 
when national courts wants to apply EU law with the intention to reinforce their opinion 
against public institutions. To test this argument I will interact this variable with ‘Against 
state or public institutions’ variable. 
c) Control Variables: 
- Type of EU law invoker: This variable adopts the value of 0 if an individual is invoking EU 
law enforcement against the defendant, 1 if it is a firm, 2 if it is an ONG, environmental 
association or trade union, and 3 in the case of the government, administration or public 
body. From the party capability theory (Galanter 1974; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999) 
the resources and litigation experience of litigants affects their chances of success. 
Governments, administration, business and interest groups are accustomed to acting as 
repeat players in the courts, increasing their experience of how to deal with these issues 
thus achieving success. Moreover, administration, as well as big firms, has more resources 
(e.g. money and time) to expend on these cases if we compare them with mere individuals, 
such as workers. Therefore, I expect a lower application of EU law when it is invoked by 
individuals than for the rest of actors due to their lesser organizational power and 
experience (Slepcevic 2009). 
- National court citation: The variable codes 1 if the Supreme Court has cited a previous 
national ruling, e.g. coming from the Supreme, Constitutional or regional courts; and 0 
otherwise. In this case there is not a straightforward hypothesis. On one hand, the Supreme 
Court may use national precedents to support EU law application against the government 
for the same reason that they use ECJ citations. On the other hand, the court can interpret 
and quote national court precedent as a reinforcing signal against the application of EU 
law. 
- Treaty enforcement: The variable codes 1 if the case involves the application or interpretation 
of a Treaty or primary law, 0 otherwise. National courts may be more persuadable in the 
application of EU law when the litigants invoke EU primary or constitutional legislation 
against national law. 
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- National constitution enforcement: The variable codes 1 if constitutional provisions are alleged 
against EU law and 0 otherwise. National courts will not enforce EU law when core 
national provisions are alleged against EU regulations. 
- Legal experience in EU law: The variable measures the number of EU law cases filed in the 
Supreme Court. The number of cases has been distinguished by jurisdiction: Penal, Social, 
Military, Civil and Administrative. Judges, case after case, become acquainted with EU law 
and discriminate as to whether EU law is enforceable or not. Hence, EU enforcement is 
more likely when NC have more experience in EU law cases. 
- EU support: The variable codes the results of the Eurobarometer for Spain on the question 
of whether citizens think that EU membership is a ‘good thing’. Burley and Mattli claim 
that judges cannot deviate from the political preferences of the public opinion regarding 
European Union (Burley and Mattli 1993; Carrubba and Murrah 2005). Courts are worried 
about the judgment of public opinion on Europe. The more public opinion is against EU, 
the greater the cost to the national court’s legitimacy if it chooses to apply EU law. Hence, 
national courts are more likely to enforce EU law when the national political environment 
is favorable to European integration. 
- Years until election: The variable codes the years that left until the next election when the 
EU law decision was taken. On should think that national governments will try to preserve 
their core national regulations from EU law, especially when these policies are meant to 
benefit their own constituency and produce electoral returns. National courts may 
challenge these policies when national elections are closer, affecting their electoral returns. 
Due to the margin of political reaction of the government to judge’s decisions is reduced in 
the parliamentarian, governmental or administrative arena as the elections are closer, 
national governments may make an effort for opposing EU law. 
- Type of Policy: The variable is coded as 1 if the case concerns the field of employment, free 
movement of workers, environment, and health and consumer protection, and 0 otherwise. 
- Type of Government: The variable adopts the value 1 during the months that the socialist 
party was in office, and 0 in the months when the conservative party was. This variable 
interacts in an interesting way with the ‘type of policy’ variable, testing if courts apply EU 
law less in policy issues supported by the party in government. For example, the application 
of EU law on social issues (e.g. employment) preferred by the socialist party. Hence, the 
likelihood that a national court applies EU law will be lesser when it is enforced against the 
ideology of the government. 
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Method: For the analysis of the dependent variable I estimate a probit model that is 
adequate for dummy variables.6 Moreover, there is the possibility of finding a correlation or 
interdependence between rulings on legal issues from the same case decided, which would 
artificially deflate standard errors. To control for this situation I introduce standard errors 
clustered by case, making more flexible the assumption that observations are independent. 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this section I test the factors of EU law enforcement by the Supreme Court, trying to 
assess whether the court is constrained by the government in its application and under 
which conditions. The variables used in the analysis are summarized in the following table: 
Table	  1:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EU law enforcement 205 .5463415 .4990666 0 1 
Individual invokes EU law 205 .2243902 .4182014 0 1 
Business invokes EU law 205 .4585366 .4994976 0 1 
Other interest groups invoke EU law 205 .1121951 .316379 0 1 
Against State or public institution 205 .5560976 .4980594 0 1 
ECJ citation 205 .5512195 .4985872 0 1 
Against State*ECJ citation 205 .3121951 .4645233 0 1 
National court citation 205 .4878049 .5010749 0 1 
Treaty enforcement 205 .2292683 .4213912 0 1 
National constitution enforcement 205 .0390244 .1941271 0 1 
Legal experience in EU law 205 6.842828 1.231789 0 8.05 
EU support 205 65.2 4.641459 57 73 
Years until next election 205 1.517073 1.198836 0 3 
Type of policy 205 .4195122 .4946872 0 1 
Type of government 205 .6487805 .47852 0 1 
Type of policy*government 205 .1560976 .3638363 0 1 
 
In the empirical results showed in table 2, one of the most remarkable outcomes is 
related to the presence of a government or administrative institution against EU law 
enforcement. Among the full models represented in the specifications 2 and 3 showed 
below, we observe at the 0.01 level of significance the likelihood that the Supreme Court 
enforces EU law is reduced when this application goes against national policies defended 
by public institutions. Therefore, the Supreme Court applies EU law less when the 
governments threat with its opposition to EU law with non-compliance or other political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A probit model assumes that the effect of the independent variables adopts the shape of a standard 
cumulative normal probability distribution, which is an S-shape, instead of a linear or logarithmic shape. 
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threat. In contrast, the table does not show other important effect as regards the type of 
EU law invoker. Moreover, there is not any impact on EU law enforcement when courts 
are considering policy issues supported by the party in government. In conclusion, these 
results show how difficult it is for a Supreme Court to challenge the policies and acts of the 
government and public institutions, despite the who is invoking EU law enforcement and 
the kind of policy that they judging. 
Table	  2:	  Probit	  analysis	  of	  the	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  the	  Spanish	  Supreme	  Court7	  
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Independent variables Dependent Variable: EU law enforcement 
Individuals invoke EU law enforcement -0.147 [0.323] 
-0.105 
[0.325] 
-0.036 
[0.333] 
Business invoke EU law enforcement -0.143 [0.284] 
-0.101 
[0.284] 
-0.076 
[0.298] 
Other groups invoke EU law enforcement -0.005 [0.404] 
-0.033 
[0.405] 
0.034 
[0.427] 
(Category of reference: Public Institutions invoke EU law enforcement) 
Against State or Public Institution -0.487** [0.228] 
-0.964*** 
[0.310] 
-0.892*** 
[0.322] 
ECJ citation 0.368* [0.193] 
-0.121 
[0.279] 
-0.124 
[0.286] 
Against State or Public Institution*ECJ citation 0.864** [0.370] 
0.806** 
[0.377] 
National Court citation 0.031 [0.184] 
0.030 
[0.185] 
-0.043 
[0.192] 
Treaty enforcement -0.055 [0.226] 
-0.021 
[0.223] 
0.066 
[0.236] 
National Court enforcement -0.365 [0.488] 
-0.465 
[0.466] 
-0.423 
[0.459] 
Legal experience in EU law 0.028 [0.090] 
0.021 
[0.088] 
-0.038 
[0.102] 
EU support   0.030 [0.024] 
Years until next election  0.208** [0.082] 
Type of policy   
-0.326 
[0.368] 
Type of government  -0.238 [0.280] 
Type of policy*Type of government 0.303 [0.422] 
Constant 0.108 [0.662] 
0.385 
[0.663] 
-1.334 
[1.608] 
Observations 205 205 205 
Pseudo-R2 0.0449 0.0643 0.0957 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
According to the arguments presented above, State institutions have several mechanisms 
that make them more successful compared with other litigants. Apart of the great amount 
of economic and experiential resources that they can invest on EU law litigations, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Logit and time-series analyses have also been estimated showing similar results. 
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threat of non-compliance may cause a court to implement a ruling according governments’ 
preferences, from what it would choose if it were completely independent. On the other 
hand, the implication of political interest in the selection and in the career of judges of the 
Supreme Court makes judges responsive to their decisions against the government. This 
finding rejects the legal argument that national courts are not constrained by political 
institutions. The vulnerability of judges to political pressures is reinforced when 
considering the effect of elections on EU law enforcement. As I expected this control 
variable shows how national courts are more prone to enforce EU law when the impact of 
their decisions on national policies are minor for the electoral game. 
According to the second hypothesis, the results demonstrate how judges are strategic 
in the use of ECJ citations as regards national governments: At the 0.05 level of 
significance, the second main explanatory variable	   ‘Against State or public institution*ECJ 
citation’ shows how the Supreme Court uses ECJ citations to shield its judgments against 
competent authorities. National courts look upon the cases already decided by the ECJ to 
find an answer to the issues it faces and support the application of EU law, legitimating 
their decisions against the menace of non-compliance and other political threats by public 
institutions. Hence, the possibility of citing the ECJ reduces the likelihood that national 
courts can be affected by political threats when enforcing EU law in policy fields that run 
counter to public institutions.8 In contrast, we observe how the ‘ECJ citation’ constitutive 
looses its significant effect when it is interacted. 
The effects of the ECJ citations as regards to whom it is used against are reported 
generating predicted probabilities for different scenarios in table 3: 
Table	  3:	  Predicted	  probabilities	  of	  the	  main	  explanatory	  variables	  
Enforcing	  EU	  law	   No	  ECJ	  citation	   ECJ	  citation	  
Against	  public	  institution	   0.2885	   0.5496	  
Against	  other	  litigants	   0.6307	   0.5831	  
 
As we see in the table, there are substantial differences in the probability of 
enforcement between categories. Firstly, the rate of failure on EU law enforcement is 35% 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It is not always possible to know if X has a meaningful conditional effect on Y from simply looking at the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficient on the interaction term. It is nearly always the case that we 
should go beyond the traditional table of results and report the marginal effect and standard errors of X on Y 
across different values of Z in order to know how the effect of X on Y changes along some range of Z values 
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: 
Improving Empirical Analyses." Political Analysis 14:63-82. These quantities of interest are reported in 
appendix 1, showing that the effect of ECJ citations (X) on EU law enforcement (Y) when the government is 
against EU law enforcement (Z=1) is different from zero and, hence, significant. 
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lower when the government is involved in the litigation to argue the non-enforcement. 
However, we observe that this probability increases by 26% when the Supreme Court finds 
a citation that can apply to the case at hand. Conversely, for the cases in which EU law is 
applied against ‘other actors’ the probability of success is reduced by almost 5% when the 
ECJ is cited. This is why the Supreme Court uses ECJ citations very frequently to argue 
that ECJ jurisprudence differs or contradicts in a significant way individuals and interest 
groups’ invocation of EU law.9  
 
CONCLUSION: CONTENDING GOVERNMENT CONTENTION 
In this paper I have tried to give a response to one of the most recurrent question 
asked by political and law scholars, that is, which factors explain the enforcement of EU 
law by national courts? This study gives some preliminary answers to this question 
supported by empirical evidence. Following the arguments offered by the literature on 
judicial independence and the capacity resource of litigation, I have tested how the 
Supreme Courts can be constrained in their decisions by public institutions. Among other 
arguments, the government has within reach some economic, experiential and, most 
important, institutional resources that can constraint the decisions taken by higher courts 
concerning EU law. 
What is more important, high courts, aware of this political threats, try to avoid these 
institutional threats empowering themselves by means of ECJ citations to legitimize their 
decisions vis-à-vis competent authorities. It explains the importance of ECJ citations for 
the implementation of EU law following the argument of Ramos Romeu (2006), Tridimas 
& Tridimas (2004) and Obermaier (2008). According to their conclusion on why national 
courts use ECJ precedent, I extended the argument, comparing the advantages of the 
precedent mechanism to the benefits of asking for ECJ rulings for national courts.  
Therefore, national judges usually cite ECJ as a normal strategy, apart of using preliminary 
rulings, in those cases where the enforcement of EU regulations may be challenged by 
national institutions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Looking for new instruments to distinguish these situations I have created a variable that identifies when the 
Supreme Court uses ECJ citations to distinguish ECJ jurisprudence from EU law invocation made by 
litigants. The results show of in the 36% of the EU law cases against ‘other actors’ the Supreme Court cites 
the ECJ jurisprudence to contradict the enforcement of EU law, while in the case of government is a 27%. 
These differences in the percentages for the use of ECJ citations against EU law enforcement can explain 
these differences in the predicted probabilities.  
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To sum up, these findings confirm the general statements of the empowerment/ 
neofunctionalist and inter-govermentalist/realist models, and contradict the legal accounts. 
There is evidence to reassert Lisa Conant’s (2002) argument in her book “Justice 
Contained” that governments of the member states find many ways around the structure of 
the EU and the ECJ rulings to evade the full force of the law. Nevertheless, the 
constitutionalization of EU law and the integration of the national judicial system in the 
EU system by means of the instrument of cooperation, such as the ECJ rulings and 
precedents, have developed powerful mechanisms to “contend” the “government 
contention of justice”. 
Therefore, contrary to Maduro’s (2003: 513) argument on the constitutionalization of 
the EU legal system, national courts are not (or they do not feel) responsible for the effective 
incorporation of EU law and ECJ jurisprudence into their national legal orders. By the 
contrary, the study gives some evidence to think that national judges are more selective than 
responsible in their enforcement of EU law and cooperation with the ECJ. The Spanish 
Supreme Court may prefer to select previous rulings that agree its own policy or legal views 
to support its decisions against the government rather than taking the risk of asking for a 
new one. By doing this, the courts avoid the possibility that the ECJ might rule against their 
legal or policy interpretations. Thus, national judges, aware of the limitations and the 
advantages of supranational adjudication for judicial enforcement, may decide between, on 
the one hand, being conservative in their dialogue with the ECJ and applying only 
precedent, or, on the other hand, being more ambitious, opening a political discussion with 
the ECJ and the national authorities for the configuration and impact of EU regulation on 
the national policies. 
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APPENIX 1: TABLES 
 
Table	  4:	  Marginal	  effects	  and	  Standard	  errors	  
Marginal	  effect	  of	  ECJ	  
citations	  
ME	  
Conditional	  
Beta	  
Conditional	  
SE	   Significance	  
when	  enforcing	  EU	  law	  against	  
other	  actors	   -­‐0.1238443	   0.2859005	   Non-­‐significant	  
when	  enforcing	  EU	  law	  against	  
public	  institutions	   0.6826378	   0.2601992	   0.0098***	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APPENDIX 2: BUILGIND A DATASET OF SPANISH SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISIONS ON EU LAW 
The data was gathered from the CASELEX database that reports the important national 
case law from National Supreme Courts and last instance courts linked to EU law from 
2000 onwards. The subject areas covered are competition law, employment law, company 
law, intellectual property law, consumer law, competition law, environmental law, freedom 
of movement law, ICT and media law, private international law, public procurement law, 
and social security law. 
For this paper I codified all the decisions taken by the Spanish Supreme Court until 
2009. The resulting dataset is considered as a sample (n=205) of the population of EU law 
cases filed in the Spanish Supreme Court (n=3146)10. Nevertheless, this data makes us to 
think of one source of selection bias, that is, the likelihood that a case will be included in 
the Caselex database by the lawyers working on this project. Caselex identifies and selects 
cases only when: (i) a national court interprets a term mentioned in an EU rule; (ii) a 
national court says something about the ‘values’ of a certain EU rule; (iii) a national court 
de facto applies an EU rule in a new way” (Faro and Nannucci 2008). This study takes 
advantage of this selection since it helps to identify cases in which Spanish Supreme Court 
decide on substantive EU issues from procedural decisions or judgments without any 
implication for the implementation of EU policies. Therefore, Caselex aggregates the most 
important case law connected with the effective implementation of EU law by national 
higher courts, leaving out all these cases that are irrelevant to EU law enforcement. In 
conclusion, this criterion increases the accuracy of our dataset rather than blurs the results, 
since they already identified the sample of cases with relevant policy implications from the 
total population. 
In addition, these differences are most likely to disappear if we think in terms of 
jurisdiction. In figure 5 we can see that, according to the sample data, some sections of the 
Supreme Court hear a lot of cases and others hear few. Curiously the distribution of cases 
among jurisdiction within the sample fits almost identically with the total distribution of 
EU law cases filed in each judicial chamber (see figure 2 above). This fact at least supports 
representativeness by jurisdiction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The population of cases was determined by searching the Spanish Supreme Court database (www. 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/index.jsp). These cases are also including decisions in which the court 
did not actually manipulate EU law as part of its reasoning or that was not rendered by the high court. For 
this reason, I expect that the number of cases in which the Supreme Court decided about the enforcement of 
EU law should be drastically lesser than the number of cases reported by the search.    
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Figure	  3:	  Distribution	  of	  EU	  law	  cases	  in	  the	  sample	  
	  
Source:	  Caselex’s	  EU	  law	  cases	  
 
Finally, the data only contains information on cases in which EU law was applied or 
not, but not for the cases in which EU law should have been applied but was not. 
Nevertheless, this is the unique approach that is available for political and legal scholars for 
study and disentangling the factors that determine the enforcement of EU law. 
Civil;	  
13,66%	  
AdministraMve;	  
60,49%	  
Social;	  21,95%	  
Penal;	  3,41%	  Military;	  0,49%	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